Michigan Law Review
Volume 62

Issue 6

1964

Criminal Law-Reiterated Contempt of Court
Robert C. Bonges
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert C. Bonges, Criminal Law-Reiterated Contempt of Court, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1061 (1964).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol62/iss6/10

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1964]

RECENT DECISIONS

1061

CRIMINAL LAW-REITERATED CONTEMPT OF CouRT-The defendant
was found guilty of criminal contempt of court1 in a civil proceeding for
giving "don't remember" answers,2 after having been granted immunity

1 "A Court of record has power to punish for a criminal contempt, a person guilty
of •.• contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness; or, after being sworn,
to answer any legal and proper interrogatory." N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 750(5). This should
not be confused with N.Y. PEN. LAw § 600, which, in similiar language, defines contempt
of court as a misdemeanor and provides for a criminal prosecution for the misdemeanor
of criminal contempt. The New York courts have held that the two statutes are wholly
independent of each other and both remedies or either may be pursued. People ex rel.
Sherwin v. Mead, 92 N.Y. 415, 420 (1883); In re Amato, 204 Misc. 454, 124 N.Y.S.2d 726
(Sup. Ct. 1953).
2 Although the defendant did not in form refuse to testify, the court felt justified
in concluding that his "don't remember" answers were, in fact, a refusal to testify.
People ex rel. Cirillo v. Warden, 11 N.Y.2d 51, 181 N.E.2d 424, 226 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1962).
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from prosecution,3 to questions concerning his activities, asked during a
grand jury investigation of an attempted homicide. For his refusal to
testify, the defendant was given the maximum penalty provided for criminal
contempt under the applicable statute.4 After paying the fine and serving
the sentence, the defendant was brought before the same grand jury
thirty-five days later and was asked the same questions. The defendant
repeated the "don't remember" answers and was again fined and incarcerated. On appeal, held, affirmed, one judge dissenting. The defendant's
refusal to answer at his second appearance before the grand jury constituted
a separate and new act of contempt rather than a continuation of the
previous refusal. Second Additional Grand Jury v. Cirillo, 12 N.Y.2d 206,
188 N.E.2d 138,237 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1963).
The power invoked by the court in the principal case to punish for
contempt, although regulated by legislation, is inherent in the courts because
it is necessary to the execution of the court's powers." A criminal contempt
conviction is said to be punitive in nature and the punishment is for the
purpose of vindicating the authority of the court.6 In this context criminal
contempt is not a crime in the sense of being a misdemeanor or a felony;7
consequently, the doctrine of double jeopardy is often said to have no
application in the multiple or reiterated contempt situation.8 More frequently, as in the principal case, the courts avoid the double jeopardy issue
by holding that each reiterated contempt is a separate offense; thus the
accused is not being punished twice for the same act.9 Behind this reasoning
lies the policy that each individual must testify if necessary, 10 and that
society has the right to every man's evidence. 11 The reiterated contempt
3 The immunity granted by the state protects the witness against prosecution under
its laws for wrongdoing the witness himself might disclose during the investigation.
N.Y. PEN. LAw § 2447. However, the immunity extended by the state does not protect him
against prosecution by the federal government or by other states. Mills v. Louisiana,
360 U.S. 230 (1959); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); People v. Riela, 7 N.Y.2d
571, 166 N.E.2d 840, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1960).
4 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 751, provides for punishment for contempt of court, under
§ 750, by fine not exceeding $250, or by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days, or both.
5 See Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888).
6 Gompers v. Bucks Stove 8e Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911). If the punishment
is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant the contempt is civil. Ibid. However,
the distinction between criminal contempt and civil contempt is not at all clear. For
a discussion of that distinction, see generally Goldfarb, The Varieties of the Contempt
Power, 13 SYRACUSE L. REv. 44 (1961).
7 See note 1 supra.
8 "In fact, it has been repeatedly held that one who has been found guilty of
contempt under the provisions of the Judiciary Law may not thereafter invoke the
defense of former jeopardy because the former is not a crime." People ex rel. Amarante
v. McDonnell, 100 N.Y.S.2d 463, 469 (Sup. Ct. 1950); cf. State v. Kasherman, 177 Minn.
200, 224 N.W. 838, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 602 (1929).
9 Ex parte Stice, 70 Cal. 51, 11 Pac. 459 (1886); In re Ward, 295 Mich. 742, 295 N.W.
483 (1940); cf. Williams v. Davis, 27 Cal. 2d 746, 751, 167 P.2d 189, 192 (1946).
10 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
11 See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961). This is, of course,
subject to the witness' constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and the various
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cases generally fall into one of three categories: refusals concerning (1)
separate subjects on the same day, (2) the same subject on the same day,
or (3) the same subject on different days. In the first category each refusal
constitutes a separate contempt.12 However, in the second category the
initial refusal marks the contumacious act and the prosecution cannot multiply contempt convictions by repeatedly asking questions related to that
subject. 18 When the courts are presented with cases in the third category,
as in the principal case, they normally hold that each refusal constitutes
a separate contempt. 14 Illustrative of a single case presenting both of the
latter two categories is United States v. Costello.HS The defendant had been
brought before a congressional investigating committee on two succeeding
days, and on both days had repeatedly refused to give any testimony whatever, claiming that he was suffering from acute laryngitis. He was convicted
for multiple contempts. When an appeal was brought to contest the validity
of those convictions, the counts relating to the defendant's repeated refusal
to testify on a particular day were reduced to one count.16 However, the
court affirmed the two counts which were based on the initial refusal to
testify on each day, without discussion of the issue of whether the mere fact
that the refusals occurred on different days justified making the refusal on
the second day a separate contempt. Neither did the court discuss the
possibilities of oppression that would arise if a witness were returned for
questioning day after day.
The principal case dealt directly with the problem only tacitly recognized in Costello. While the decision in the principal case was amply
supported by authority,17 at least two grounds exist on which the validity
immunity provisions contained in state and federal statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. LAw
§ 2447.
12 Only one case was found in this category. A witness, without claiming the privilege
of immunity, refused to testify or refused to remember, during a single day, who were
the participants with him in five separate telephone conversations, and he was convicted
of five separate contempts. People v. Saperstein, 2 N.Y.2d 210, 140 N.E.2d 252, 159
N.Y.S.2d 160, cert. denied, 353 U.S. 946 (1957).
18 A witness refused to answer seventeen questions relating to an alleged crime
syndicate meeting, and he was held to have "carved out" an area of refusal. People v.
Riela, 7 N.Y.2d 571, 166 N.E.2d 840, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1960); accord, Yates v. United
States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957); United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 1953);
United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952);
United States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F. Supp. 991, 992 (D. Hawaii 1950). But see Lawson v.
United States, 176 F.2d 49, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1949). In People v. Riela, supra, the court
distinguished People v. Saperstein, supra note 12, on the ground that the defendant
in the case did not "carve out an area of refusal." If a witness were not allowed to
"carve out" a subject about which he will not testify there would be a premium on
completely refusing to testify, since that is treated as only one contempt. See 20 GA. B.J.
413 (1958).
14 See Ex parte Stice, 70 Cal. 51, 11 Pac. 459 (1886); In re Ward, 295 Mich. 742, 295
N.W. 483 (1940); State v. Kasherman, 177 Minn. 200, 224 N.W. 838, cert. denied, 280 U.S.
602 (1929).
llS 198 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952).
10 Id. at 204.
17 See cases cited note 14 supra.
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of its reasoning can be questioned. The first is that the defendant was
merely repeating his first refusal and thus, for the same reason that repeated
refusals within a given day are treated as only one contempt, he was likewise
guilty of only one contempt. Admittedly, a witness has a duty to testify, but
does the passing of a day, as in Costello, or a month, as in the principal
case, enlarge the duty? If the contempt is complete when the witness refuses
to give any testimony on one particular day, why is it not then complete
with respect to the whole investigation? Conceivably, the only respite for
such a witness would depend upon the limited stamina of the prosecution.
The situation is analogous to the case of a person who commits two assaults,
each on the same provocation, yet each on different days. Clearly there are
two punishable offenses; yet repeated blows during any one assault render
the attacker liable for only one conviction. However, the purpose of an
assault conviction is to deter the defendant from committing the act again,
while the purpose of the contempt conviction is to induce the witness to
testify. 18 Thus, whether the refusals constitute one or two offenses might
depend upon whether the repeated questions are part of a valid attempt
to obtain evidence or are for the purpose of additionally punishing the
witness for his contumacy regardless of the benefit that might be obtained
from his testimony. In the latter case, especially if the need for the testimony
of the witness has diminished, the second conviction would seem to be more
for the purpose of harassment, and the court should consider the two refusals
as only one offense.
The second major objection to the result in the principal case is that,
even if the distinction between refusals to answer on a single day and
refusals on different days when the questions relate to the same subject is
justifiable, the policy which favors valid efforts to obtain testimony should
be limited by the danger of punishing a witness who is honestly unable to
answer. In the principal case, the court hinted at this restriction by noting
that at some point repeated convictions based on the same refusal could
"be so numerous or onerous as to deny due process to the person questioned."19 While this expressed fear runs counter to the assumption that
these are "separate and distinct" offenses,20 the argument does recognize
the possibility that courts may not always be accurate in their determination
of whether repeated questioning is justified as a valid attempt to obtain
evidence, or is for the purpose of harassment. Although in the principal
case the court was perhaps justified in treating the defendant's lapse of
18 State v. Kasherman, 177 Minn. 200, 224 N.W. 838, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 602 (1929).
Principal case at 2ll, 188 N.E.2d at 141, 237 N.Y.S.2d at '713; see People ex rel.
Valenti v. McCloskey, 6 N.Y.2d 390, 404-05, 160 N.E.2d 647, 655, 189 N.Y.S.2d 898, 909
(1959), 28 FORDHAM L. REv. 540; cf. Ex parte Stice, 70 Cal. 51, II Pac. 459 (1886).
20 There is no concern about denial of due process to the two-time assaulter, and
conceivably the court would have reached the same result if the convictions had been
for the misdemeanor of criminal contempt. See note I supra. Compare People ex rel.
Amarante v. McDonnell, 100 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (criminal contempt), with
People v. Amarante, 100 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (misdemeanor of criminal contempt).
10
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memory as an obvious unprivileged or recalcitrant refusal to testify, until
the due process limitation is more adequately defined the danger exists
that contempt proceedings may be used to exact testimony which the court
deems satisfactory. AF, the dissenting judge pointed out, if the power repeatedly to incarcerate such a defendant "is upheld in one case, it can be
abused in other cases."21
The legal machinery apparently exists by which a reluctant witness can
be punished indefinitely. AF, a practical matter, however, when contempt
convictions are multiplied during a single proceeding the sentences usually
run concurrently.22 Nevertheless, the courts should seriously consider the
validity of the distinction between refusals occurring on the same day and
refusals occurring on different days, since the metaphysical "separateness"
of the offenses due to the mere passing of a day seems to cloud the real
policy issues involved. In the principal case the court suggested that contempt adjudications based on the same refusal could result at some point
in a denial of due process. The court did not enunciate any criteria to help
decide when that point would be reached. In view of the competing policy
considerations between the right to obtain testimony and the possibilities
of vindictive oppression that may arise from the exercise of that right, it
would seem that due process is denied when the repeated questions are
principally for the purpose of harassing a witness. In the principal case no
mention was made of the relevancy of the evidence the witness might have
provided. Presumably the grand jury still needed the information the defendant supposedly possessed to complete its investigation. In order to
balance society's rights against the rights of the individual, these factors
should have been considered.
Robert C. Bonges

21
22

Principal case at 211, 188 N.E.2d at 141, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 713.
See, e.g., Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1949).

